Global ethics: increasing our positive impact by Horton, Keith
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-2014 
Global ethics: increasing our positive impact 
Keith Horton 
University of Wollongong, khorton@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Horton, Keith, "Global ethics: increasing our positive impact" (2014). Faculty of Law, Humanities and the 
Arts - Papers. 1816. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1816 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Global ethics: increasing our positive impact 
Abstract 
Global ethics is no ordinary subject. It includes some of the most urgent and momentous issues the world 
faces, such as extreme poverty and climate change. Given this, any adequate review of that subject 
should, I suggest, ask some questions about the relation between what those working in that subject do 
and the real-world phenomena that are the object of their study. The main question I focus on in this 
essay is this: should academics and others working in the field of global ethics take new measures aimed 
at having more real-world positive impact on the phenomena they study? Should they take new measures, 
that is, aimed at bringing about more improvements in those phenomena, improvements such as 
reductions in extreme poverty and in emissions of greenhouse gases? I defend a positive answer to this 
question against some objections, and also discuss some of the kinds of measure we might take in an 
attempt to have more positive impact. 
Keywords 
impact, our, positive, increasing, global, ethics 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
Horton, K. J. (2014). Global ethics: increasing our positive impact. Journal of Global Ethics, 10 (3), 
304-311. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1816 
1 
 
Global Ethics: Increasing our Positive Impact 
 
Abstract 
Global ethics is no ordinary subject. It includes some of the most urgent and momentous 
issues the world faces, such as extreme poverty and climate change. Given this, any adequate 
review of that subject should, I suggest, ask some questions about the relation between what 
those working in that subject do, and the real-world phenomena that are the object of their 
study. The main question I focus on in this essay is this: should academics and others 
working in the field of global ethics take new measures aimed at having more real-world 
positive impact on the phenomena they study? Should they take new measures, that is, aimed 
at bringing about more improvements in those phenomena, improvements such as reductions 
in extreme poverty and in emissions of greenhouse gases? I defend a positive answer to this 
question against some objections, and also discuss some of the kinds of measure we might 
take in an attempt to have more positive impact. 
 
Keywords 






Global ethics is no ordinary subject. It includes some of the most urgent and momentous 
issues the world faces, such as extreme poverty, climate change, and war.1 Given this, any 
adequate review of that subject should, I suggest, ask some questions about the relation 
between what those working in that subject do, and the real-world phenomena that are the 
object of their study. One such question is this: do the community of academics and others 
working in the field of global ethics (henceforth ‘we’, since this essay is addressed mainly to 
that community) have any positive impact on those phenomena? That is (as I shall understand 
that phrase), does anything we do lead to improvements in those phenomena, improvements 
such as reductions in extreme poverty and in emissions of greenhouse gases? 
Although the causal chains are inevitably hard to disentangle, it is surely the case that 
we have some positive impact by performing the kinds of activities that academics in every 
discipline perform, such as teaching and supervising students, conducting research, 
publishing that research in academic journals and in books, and so on. Is performing such 
standard academic activities enough? Or should we go beyond such activities and take special 
measures aimed at increasing our positive impact, given the urgency and importance of some 
issues in global ethics? 
That question raises another: what ‘special measures’ might enable us to increase our 
positive impact? The kinds of measure I have in mind include directing more research 
towards issues where more research seems relatively likely to lead to more positive impact; 
attempting to disseminate such research beyond standard academic audiences more 
effectively; joining or setting up organisations that seek to enable academics to have more 
                                                 
1 I shall take ‘global ethics’ to be the study of ethical issues (in a broad sense of that term that includes questions 
of justice) that have global or near-global dimensions. 
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positive impact in particular areas of global ethics; and setting up closer links with parties 
beyond academia who have similar aims such as certain NGOs and think-tanks.2 
As many readers of this paper will know, some scholars working in global ethics are 
already taking such measures. (I give a few examples towards the end of this paper, where I 
also discuss these measures in a little more detail.) So that raises another question, my main 
topic in this essay: should we take additional measures beyond those we are already taking, in 
an attempt to have more positive impact than we are currently having?3  
My main aims here are to defend a positive answer to this question against certain 
objections, and more broadly to stimulate discussion about this question and related 
questions. The main reason for saying that we should try to have more positive impact is 
simply how important such impact is:4 how important it is that people get out of extreme 
poverty, that climate change does not run completely out of control, and so on. This reason is 
so obviously a strong one that I assume I don’t need to say any more about it here. If people 
disagree with the claim that we should try to have more positive impact, it won’t be because 
they don’t think that having such positive impact is important, but for other reasons. I put 
some of those reasons in the form of objections in the next paragraph. 
 
                                                 
2 The distinction between standard academic activities and special measures aimed at increasing one’s positive 
impact is of course a fuzzy one. 
3 Such additional measures may be new kinds of measure not used before, or more of the same kinds of measure 
that have already been used. 
4 So to reiterate: the claim that ‘we should try to have more positive impact’ is my shorthand for the claim that 
‘we, the community of academics and others working in the field of global ethics, should take additional 
measures beyond those we are already taking, in an attempt to bringing about more improvements in the 
phenomena we study in the real world than we are currently bringing about’ (improvements such as reductions 
in extreme poverty and in emissions of greenhouse gases). 
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The notion of a collective effort by the community of academics and others working in the 
field of global ethics to have more positive impact only makes sense if we agree about the 
ethical issues. Otherwise we would be pulling in different directions, recommending different 
actions, advocating different policies. Even a cursory look at the literature on global ethics 
reveals, however, that there are deep and persistent disagreements about many issues in 
global ethics. Even if this point were put aside, moreover, there is a division of labour 
between academics and other groups in society such as NGOs, activists, and policy makers. 
The primary roles of academics working in the field of practical ethics are educating 
students, and putting forward and assessing arguments concerning the various substantive 
issues that field raises in an impartial, independent way. Some of the resulting work should of 
course feed in to the deliberations of other parties, ideally in ways that lead to real-world 
improvements. It is not a good idea for academics to take on more activist roles, however. In 
part this is because doing so would compromise our independence and impartiality. In part it 
is because such efforts are unlikely to be successful, given the different skill-sets that 
academia and activism demand. Better to stick with what we are trained to do and are good 
at and leave it to others to do what they are trained to do and are good at. 
 
I’ll consider these objections in turn. First, how much disagreement is there among 
scholars of global ethics about the key issues in the field? To my knowledge, no one 
researches such questions systematically,5 and so the best one can hope for is an informed 
estimate. The main background point I would make is that there are a number of reasons why 
                                                 
5 Perhaps this is a task the Journal of Global Ethics might take on?  (David Bourget and David Chalmers 
conducted a survey of professional philosophers and others on their philosophical views on behalf of PhilPapers 
in November 2009 (see http://philpapers.org/surveys/ and Bourget and Chalmers 2013). The questions in the 
survey were extremely coarse-grained, however, and so of no help to us here.) 
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the literature on global ethics may give one the impression that there is more disagreement in 
that field than there is in fact. As Jonathan Glover writes, ‘in philosophy . . . reputations are 
not made by agreeing with other people’ (Glover 1995: 118).6 Philosophers are generally 
trained to respond to the work of others with objections, and to tease out points of 
disagreement even in work with which they broadly agree. Indeed, many philosophers would 
consider it rather dull to argue for conclusions already widely accepted by other philosophers, 
at least unless they had an interesting new argument for those conclusions. They would also 
find it hard to publish such work (at least in the refereed journals academics tend to be 
rewarded for publishing in), for journal editors too tend to seek work in areas where there are 
active controversies.  
When one takes such factors into account, it is far from clear that there is too much 
disagreement among scholars of global ethics for a collective effort to have more positive 
impact to be feasible.7 And in fact it seems to me that there is quite a lot of consensus in 
global ethics, especially about recommendations for action or policy as opposed to reasons 
for those recommendations, and about what would constitute improvements to current 
practices, policies, and institutions as opposed to ideal solutions. In the case of global 
poverty, for example, there is very broad agreement among moral and political philosophers 
                                                 
6 I focus mainly on philosophers because I take it that a large proportion of writing on global ethics is by 
philosophers (broadly conceived) and because I understand the culture of academic philosophy better than that 
of other disciplines. 
7 When I talk about a ‘collective effort’ among scholars of global ethics to have more positive impact I do not of 
course mean one centrally organised enterprise. I mean lots of individual and group efforts that are to a lesser or 
greater degree autonomous. The term ‘collective effort’ will still be appropriate to the degree that all these 
separate efforts are (a) motivated by a common desire to have more positive impact, and (b) sensitive to similar 




that tackling extreme poverty globally should be given a much higher priority by a wide 
range of actors than it currently receives.8 Admittedly, there is a lot of disagreement about 
how to specify this claim more precisely. Nonetheless, there is a lot of agreement about 
certain policy changes that should be implemented. To give a few familiar examples: rich 
countries should cease dumping heavily subsidised products in poor countries in ways that 
undercut local producers; far greater resources should be dedicated to diseases such as 
malaria and schistosomiasis that mainly affect the global poor; tough new measures should be 
taken to prevent (or at least reduce) illicit financial flows from poor countries;  and a tiny 
‘Robin Hood’ tax should be imposed on international transactions with at least a large 
proportion of the money raised going to support poverty reduction. 
Indeed, the degree of consensus on such matters is remarkable given the points made 
above about the culture of disagreement within the discipline of philosophy, and the fact that 
philosophers and others tackle these issues using many contrasting moral theories and 
outlooks. I think it also fairly clear what the explanation for such broad agreement is: given 
certain very basic and widely shared values, a reasonably open, fair-minded look at the facts, 
and some moderate argumentation skills, the space for reasonable disagreement about many 
of these issues is quite narrow. There is of course room for reasonable disagreement about 
what exactly should be done in response to climate change (to alter the example). There is 
little if any argument that stands up to serious scrutiny against the claim that rich countries 
should reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases much more quickly than is currently 
projected, however, and that they should also contribute far more to help poor countries adapt 
to climate change. 
                                                 
8 I use poverty and (to a lesser extent) climate change as examples mainly because I am relatively well-
acquainted with those areas. I imagine that much of what I say would apply to at least some other areas of global 
ethics too, though of course the terrain will be different in each case. 
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 If this is roughly correct, academics working in global ethics are not prevented from 
making a collective effort to have more positive impact because they disagree too much 
among themselves. Now let’s turn to the points related to the idea of a division of labour 
between academics and other groups in society. I am happy to accept the claim that at least in 
certain circumstances the primary roles of academics working in practical ethics (in general) 
are educating students, and putting forward and assessing arguments concerning the various 
substantive issues that the field raises in an impartial, independent way. If one has performed 
those roles, however, and comes to the conclusion that many current practices, policies, and 
institutions related to a particular area of practical ethics (such as global ethics) are morally 
indefensible, and that the results include suffering and death on massive scales, there is surely 
a strong case that special measures are called for.  And that case is made even stronger if the 
overwhelming majority of those working in that field of ethics have come to similar 
conclusions. 
To be sure, if the division of labour between academics and other groups in society 
were working well, it might be unnecessary for academics to take special measures in an 
attempt to have more positive impact. I take it that no one thinks that division of labour is 
working well, though. It has become a truism that much academic work is now carried out in 
disciplinary (and even subdisciplinary) silos. Little of the work done in global ethics, in 
particular, appears to be read even by people in other academic disciplines, and still less is 
taken up by other parties such as NGOs and policy makers in ways that lead to real-world 
improvements.9 Surely it is not satisfactory to remain within an academic cocoon taking part 
                                                 
9 There are some philosophers working on poverty who have broken through to wider audiences, such as Peter 
Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, and the economist-philosopher Amartya Sen. However, in part this 
is precisely because these individuals have taken the kinds of measure I am advocating here (such as focusing 
on issues where more research seems relatively likely to lead to more positive impact and attempting to 
disseminate such research beyond standard academic audiences effectively). My suggestion is that more people 
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in debates (even ever more sophisticated debates) that seldom engage with anything or 
anyone beyond ourselves and our students, while all the time the terrible consequences of the 
wrongful practices, policies, and institutions we study continue unabated. Indeed, doing so 
seems better classified as one of the pathologies of the academy than as an index of 
professional virtue. 
In response one might say that academics may (and perhaps should) do something 
aimed at contributing to real-world improvements in the areas global ethics covers, but that 
they should do so as citizens rather than as academics. If one has reached one’s conclusions 
in one’s work as an academic, however, and one is more likely to be able to have an influence 
as an academic, it seems appropriate to contribute as an academic. Indeed, for these and 
related reasons, one can make a strong case that academics can have ‘duties of engagement’, 
as Thomas Pogge and Luis Cabrera call them (2012: 165). Many academics are trained at 
least in part at public expense, and so if they reach conclusions relevant to important public 
matters it seems reasonable to expect them to share those conclusions publicly, especially if 
those conclusions are not widely acknowledged. Once this expectation is current, moreover, 
the failure to speak out might ‘reasonably be interpreted as academic acceptance that the 
main views represented in the public debate are credible and consistent with the available 
evidence’ (Cabrera and Pogge 2012: 168). In circumstances in which those views are not 
credible and consistent with the available evidence, the duty to speak out seems especially 
strong. Cabrera and Pogge also point out that some academics already involved in public 
debates are paid or rewarded in other ways to do so by corporations and other interested 
                                                                                                                                                        
working in the field of global ethics do so. Of course, we haven’t all got the abilities that these philosophers 
have. It doesn’t follow that we aren’t able to contribute usefully to such efforts, however, in part for a reason I 
give shortly in the main text. 
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parties. When that is so, ‘silence will merely concede the terrain to academics for hire’ 
(Cabrera and Pogge 2012: 165). 
Would speaking out (or attempting to have more positive impact in other ways) mean 
compromising one’s independence or impartiality? No; one might have reached the views 
one advocates through a process of impartial, independent research. Admittedly, if one 
becomes engaged, impartiality may become harder to achieve, and one may also be tempted 
to sacrifice some measure of independence for the greater good. (One may choose not to 
criticise a certain view, for example, because that view is strongly held by many of those with 
whom one wants to make common cause on other matters.) These matters are difficult, and I 
shall just make one or two brief comments on them here. On the one hand, one may resist 
such temptations (if that is the right word for them) if one considers it right to do so. In 
addition, as an academic one may choose a style of advocacy that reflects certain intellectual 
values important in academia, such as norms of truth-seeking and truth-telling, and of 
intellectual fairness, openness, and integrity. And so one may choose not to use whatever 
argument is likely to be most convincing to one’s audience, for example, if it is not the 
argument one believes to be strongest; not to attack any objections to one’s conclusions with 
any means to hand, even if one believes that one or more of those objections has some force; 
and so on. On the other hand, one may feel that the momentous importance of some issues in 
global ethics makes it appropriate to put positive impact ahead of other values, especially 
when those issues are also urgent. In the case of climate change, in particular, we now appear 
to have a rapidly diminishing window of opportunity to avoid a catastrophe of barely 
imaginable proportions. If it is ever appropriate to put positive impact first, surely it is in this 
case. 
Of course, this assumes that we may be able to have (more) positive impact. And that 
leads us onto the final worry sketched above, that efforts by academics to have positive 
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impact are unlikely to be successful given the different skills that academia and activism 
demand. In response, I agree that some, perhaps many academics will lack some of the skills 
that may be useful in measures aimed at having more positive impact.10 Other academics will 
have those skills, though, and those who lack those skills can either develop them or 
collaborate with others (whether academics or not) who have them. In relation to the former, 
many academics have developed other new skills in recent years, such as grant writing, the 
use of online teaching methods, and industry liaison. If many academics can learn these 
skills, many should also be able to learn new skills relevant to increasing one’s positive 
impact. In relation to the latter (collaborating with others), there are many roles that 
academics might play in activities aimed at having positive impact, not all of which require 
special skills. Conducting some appropriate forms of research may not require special skills, 
for example, and organising usually involves a number of unglamorous background tasks 
(contacting relevant people, responding to inquiries of various kinds, organising and 
attending meetings, writing grant applications, managing projects, and so on) that most 
academics could do.11  
It’s hard to predict the probability of success of efforts to have more positive impact, 
especially given the wide variety of activities that might come under that heading and the 
wide range of areas global ethics covers. It seems a little pusillanimous, though, to take such 
uncertainty as a decisive reason to give up before even trying. Certainly, the claim that 
academics can’t have more real-world positive impact on the areas global ethics covers than 
they are currently having is extremely implausible. For one thing, that claim implies that 
academics already happen to be acting in just the way that has the maximum possible positive 
impact, which is highly implausible a priori. In addition, one can point to a number of kinds 
                                                 
10 I also do not object to using the word ‘activist’ to describe some of those measures. 
11 This is my main response to the concern raised in n. 9 above.  
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of measure that look promising. I mentioned four of those in the second paragraph of this 
essay, and will finish by saying a little more about each of them.  
The first is directing more research effort towards what one might call ‘strategic’ 
issues in global ethics; issues, that is, where there seems a relatively high probability that 
more research (suitably disseminated) would lead to real-world improvements. ‘Directing’ 
more research effort towards such issues would be constituted by academics choosing to 
focus on those issues rather than on less strategic issues; academics advising students to do 
so; journal and book editors encouraging and incentivising people to do so; and so on. Note 
that certain issues that would count as ‘important’ or even ‘very important in practice’ on 
some perfectly reasonable interpretations of those terms may not count as ‘strategic’. They 
would not do so if researching those issues and disseminating the findings suitably wouldn’t 
be likely to change anyone’s behaviour, or enough people’s behaviour, or the right people’s 
behaviour. 
Which issues are (the most) strategic? That is a crucial question, and one that I think 
there should be far more discussion about. For now, I will just list a few general types of 
issue that might provide good places to look. One is currently under-researched issues that 
people need to understand better in order to make important decisions related to global ethics 
wisely.12 Another is what Des Gasper calls ‘descriptive global ethics’: ‘the close 
investigation of the ethical stances of publics, politicians, policy analysts, economists, 
environmentalists, lawyers, businessmen, etc., and not only fellow ethicists’ (Gasper 2014: 
                                                 
12 For more on this theme and on the need for better dissemination of already existing research relevant to such 
decisions see Horton 2012. 
12 
 
xx)). And a third is issues where innovative new policies are needed to tackle major structural 
problems related to global ethics.13 
The second kind of measure is attempting to disseminate such research beyond 
standard academic audiences more effectively. Again, the focus should be on research that 
seems relatively likely to have a positive impact when disseminated. Active efforts at 
dissemination are necessary because there is unfortunately no invisible hand directing 
research that might make a difference to those to whom it is relevant. Indeed, there are often 
forces actively seeking to deter or distract people from taking note of ethically informed 
research.14  
The third category is joining or setting up organisations or networks that seek to 
enable academics to have more positive impact in particular areas of global ethics such as 
climate change, international trade, migration, and poverty. These organisations might be 
mainly for academics specialising in global ethics, or for academics from many different 
disciplines.15 One important task for organisations of the latter type is fostering strategic 
inter-disciplinary research. Another is supporting and building up the capacities of academia 
                                                 
13 Current examples of such research by philosophers working in the field of global ethics include Thomas 
Pogge’s Health Impact Fund (http://healthpositive impactfund.org/) and  Leif Wenar’s Clean Trade Initiative 
(http://www.cleantrade.org/policy_brief.pdf).  
14 Examples in the case of climate change would include many fossil fuel companies and the media 
organisations, think-tanks, lobbyists, politicians, and political parties they fund. 
15 In the poverty field (broadly construed) one such organisation that puts having positive impact (understood as 
bringing about real-world improvements) explicitly into the official statement of its aims is the International 
Development Ethics Association (IDEA), which is ‘committed to bringing about improvements in development 
and environmental policies, institutions and projects’ (http://developmentethics.org/about-2/). Another is 
Academics Stand Against Poverty (ASAP), whose overarching aim is ‘helping scholars, teachers and students 
enhance their positive impact on global poverty’ (http://academicsstand.org/about/mission/).  (Full disclosure: 
I’m a co-founder and board member of ASAP.)  
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in developing countries.16 Such organisations might also encourage academics in other 
disciplines to take some of the measures I’ve already suggested, such as directing more 
research effort towards strategic issues and disseminating such research beyond standard 
academic audiences more effectively.17 
Finally, one might try working more closely with parties beyond academia who have 
similar aims (such as certain NGOs, think-tanks, practitioners, and activists) in ways that 
enhance the capacities of all parties. Researchers in global ethics may be able to enrich the 
research capacities of certain NGOs, for example, and those NGOs may be useful in 
disseminating the work of those researchers, suggesting how academics themselves might 
reach and persuade new audiences, and advising on what issues are strategic (in the sense 
given above). Academics and practitioners might also work together on more projects. 
As the examples I have given indicate, some academics working on global poverty are 
already taking such measures. Still, there is certainly no shortage of promising activities for 
those willing to add to this effort to do. And I imagine that the same will be true of many 
other areas of global ethics. No doubt there are other kinds of measure not listed here, 
moreover, that might enable us to increase our positive impact. It would be helpful if there 
were an inventory of measures aimed at positive impact already taken by academics in the 
different areas of global ethics, ideally with notes on whether they seemed to be successful or 
not and why. It would also be helpful if there were an inventory of promising measures that 
have not yet been tried, and of measures that have been used successfully that could be scaled 
up.18 Those wishing to contribute to such efforts could then try those measures. 
                                                 
16 For more on this see Kapur 2010, esp. 280-1. 
17 For a helpful taxonomy of the kinds of contribution academics (in general) might make to reducing poverty in 
particular, see Caney 2012. The same article also contains a useful list of norms that Caney suggests academics 
should follow when making such contributions, an important topic that I do not have space to pursue here. 
18 Might this too be a set of tasks that the Journal of Global Ethics could take on?   
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I have of course barely scratched the surface of these issues here. But I hope I have 
said enough to show that the claim that we should try to have more positive impact at least 
merits more discussion. Surely we shouldn’t discuss the future of global ethics without 
explicitly discussing whether we should try to have more positive impact and if so how.19  
                                                 
19 I’d like to thank Sirkku Hellsten, Eric Palmer, and Emma Rooksby for many helpful comments on previous 
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